Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East

Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East

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  • Create Date:2021-08-31 07:53:15
  • Update Date:2025-09-07
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  • Author:Philip H. Gordon
  • ISBN:1250217032
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Summary

Book of the Week on Fareed Zakaria GPS
Financial Times Best Books of 2020




The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades--and why it always seems to go wrong。

It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history。
--Fareed Zakaria

Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade--in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria。 The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation。 What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before。

Philip H。 Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U。S。 experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider's view on U。S。 policymaking in the region at the highest levels。 It is the story of repeated U。S。 interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well。 No future discussion of U。S。 policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world。

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Reviews

Itay

פיליפ גורדון סוקר את הכישלונות הרבים של ארצות הברית בניסיון לעורר שינויי משטר במזרח התיכון。 הספר נהיה רלוונטי מאוד במהלך הקריאה שלי עם הנסיגה האמריקאית מאפגניסטאן。 גורדון מתחיל מהחטא הקדמון: אירן ב-1953, ממשיך עם אפגניסטן והמלחמה נגד הטאליבן, עירק, לוב, מצריים וסוריה。 התבנית חוזרת בכל מקום, אי היכרות של האמריקאים עם התרבות המקומית, התמוטטות משטר דיקטטורי המייצרת ואקום שלטוני וגוררת את האזרחים חזרה לזרועות שבטיות או סקטיות, שיתוף פעולה עם קיצוניים במטרה להוריד דיקטטור, אשר עולים אחר כך לשלטון, הע פיליפ גורדון סוקר את הכישלונות הרבים של ארצות הברית בניסיון לעורר שינויי משטר במזרח התיכון。 הספר נהיה רלוונטי מאוד במהלך הקריאה שלי עם הנסיגה האמריקאית מאפגניסטאן。 גורדון מתחיל מהחטא הקדמון: אירן ב-1953, ממשיך עם אפגניסטן והמלחמה נגד הטאליבן, עירק, לוב, מצריים וסוריה。 התבנית חוזרת בכל מקום, אי היכרות של האמריקאים עם התרבות המקומית, התמוטטות משטר דיקטטורי המייצרת ואקום שלטוני וגוררת את האזרחים חזרה לזרועות שבטיות או סקטיות, שיתוף פעולה עם קיצוניים במטרה להוריד דיקטטור, אשר עולים אחר כך לשלטון, הערכת יתר של תרומת המדינות השכנות לשמירת השלום באזור, והמון היבריס。 השם של הספר מתאר את התופעה שחוזרת פעם אחר פעם: ארצות הברית מנצחת בקלות את המערכה הצבאית (ה-Short Game) ולא מצליחה בטווח הארוך לבסס שלטון חלופי מתון。 。。。more

MH

What was the premise of this book? The author makes lot of criticisms without solutions or analysis of how a situation should have been handled。 The author's criticisms aren't unfounded, but this book would have been more improved if he would have clarified the principles that could have been drawn from each situation。 The conclusion briefly hints at some principles, but these weren't clear at all in the main part of the book。 What was the premise of this book? The author makes lot of criticisms without solutions or analysis of how a situation should have been handled。 The author's criticisms aren't unfounded, but this book would have been more improved if he would have clarified the principles that could have been drawn from each situation。 The conclusion briefly hints at some principles, but these weren't clear at all in the main part of the book。 。。。more

Donald Marks

I really enjoyed this book because it took a deep dive into all the problems of the Middle East, with a heavy background of history and how we got there。 Nearly totally discourages the concept of regime change either on our part or on any other country's part I really enjoyed this book because it took a deep dive into all the problems of the Middle East, with a heavy background of history and how we got there。 Nearly totally discourages the concept of regime change either on our part or on any other country's part 。。。more

David Newman

A good read for those interested in a broad sweep of U。S。 democracy promotion in the Middle East。 The central argument is, in my opinion, low hanging fruit—which is not necessarily a bad thing。 The writing is very journalistic in style and accommodates the non-academics。 Gordon is a bit of an Obama apologist, which is unsurprising given that he worked for that administration。 So don’t expect the book to be balanced on partisan lines。 Final criticism, the chapter on Iran is the weakest, as it att A good read for those interested in a broad sweep of U。S。 democracy promotion in the Middle East。 The central argument is, in my opinion, low hanging fruit—which is not necessarily a bad thing。 The writing is very journalistic in style and accommodates the non-academics。 Gordon is a bit of an Obama apologist, which is unsurprising given that he worked for that administration。 So don’t expect the book to be balanced on partisan lines。 Final criticism, the chapter on Iran is the weakest, as it attempts to draw a seamless connection between the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953 and the 1979 Islamic Revolution。 Many would have no qualms with this, but I tend to disagree。 Overall, though, this book was an enjoyable and insightful read。 。。。more

Weiwei

This book gives an overview of the US attempts on regime changes in the ME region: for 7 decades, most attempts have failed。The main reasons are: 1) the costs of regime changes are often underestimated at the time of deployment either because a genuine lack of foresight or a deliberate choice in order to gather support for the movement, 2) toppling of the old regime is the easy part while installing a new favorable regime is the hard one, more often than not the new regime will develop an indepe This book gives an overview of the US attempts on regime changes in the ME region: for 7 decades, most attempts have failed。The main reasons are: 1) the costs of regime changes are often underestimated at the time of deployment either because a genuine lack of foresight or a deliberate choice in order to gather support for the movement, 2) toppling of the old regime is the easy part while installing a new favorable regime is the hard one, more often than not the new regime will develop an independent mind/interest that is different from the US causing the US to be in a dilemma; 3) many unintended consequences may arise as a result and often go out of control, eg Afghanistan; 4) even the experts in the US gov may still lack the actual on the ground and nuanced understanding of the complexity of the region to realistically and effectively predict the outcome or formulate the strategy, and often misled by players that have divergent agenda; 5) local people do not necessarily welcome the US involvement and may see it as imperialism。 All in all, the US should rethink its default strategy to pursue regime change。 It’s overconfidence in its exceptionalism and military power has led to high military and human costs and causing more chaos in the world。 Considering alternative channels, even tho the result may be equally unpromising or seem to take longer, as they at least allow us to avoid the known devils as stated above。 I do not have a good answer to what the best alternatives are, and maybe there shouldn’t be a single answer in the first place, but I do agree that continuing to pursue short term intervention with the hope that “we will get it right this time” is too naive and is going to do more harm than benefits。 。。。more

Alan Eyre

I guess I won’t topple any more Middle East regimes

Jonah

This book could've been an op-ed, and in fact I've read more than one op-ed in my life thats made these arguments more succinctly。 276 pages and I didn't learn a single new thing This book could've been an op-ed, and in fact I've read more than one op-ed in my life thats made these arguments more succinctly。 276 pages and I didn't learn a single new thing 。。。more

Allie

Average book on this issue。

Peter Podbielski

The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades--despite never achieving its proponents' far-reaching aims。 The definitive question, "will Americans ever learn?" will remain unanswered。 This is a must-read for every politician, policy wonk and wannabe, and pundit touting regime change。 If they haven't read Gordon's book, they should remain silent。 The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades--despite never achieving its proponents' far-reaching aims。 The definitive question, "will Americans ever learn?" will remain unanswered。 This is a must-read for every politician, policy wonk and wannabe, and pundit touting regime change。 If they haven't read Gordon's book, they should remain silent。 。。。more

N

A sobering, instructive and well-argued analysis of 70 years of US attempts of regime change in the Middle East from Mossadegh’s Iran to Assad’s Syria: all of them ultimately a failure, according to the author。

Peter Learn

A frank and informed discussion。 US policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria is shown to have resulted in millions of deaths, tens of millions of refugees, and trillions of dollars wasted。 Only Syria, Iran, Russia, the Taliban, North Korea, and any number of warlord thugs have benefited。 In each case doing nothing could hardly have been worse。

Brett Sorge

This book is just to dry for me。 Plus the author has a lot of biases which I don’t agree with。 He is looking at outcomes and shaping them to fit his thinking。 I did not finish This book as it was a very boring reading。

glassglow

Detailed and engaging history of Americans attempts at various flavors of regime change in the middle east。 Each chapter goes over the motivations, execution of, and fallout from regime change operations in one country and covers Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria。You do not need to be an expert in the middle east to read this book, but some knowledge of major players is assumed。 As long as you are willing to do some looking up as you read you will be fine。

Zeb Kantrowitz

The main problem with any plan the US has had since the end of WW2 to opt for regime change in countries that "were not on our side" has not resulted in one country being turned by military force。 Even in Serbia, we were able to initiate a change of government by economically isolating the government and leaving in to the people living there to finally change the regime。 It was Milosevic's loss of Kosovo that lead to his overthrow。For the rest of the regimes that we stuck our noses in, they are The main problem with any plan the US has had since the end of WW2 to opt for regime change in countries that "were not on our side" has not resulted in one country being turned by military force。 Even in Serbia, we were able to initiate a change of government by economically isolating the government and leaving in to the people living there to finally change the regime。 It was Milosevic's loss of Kosovo that lead to his overthrow。For the rest of the regimes that we stuck our noses in, they are still in active Civil War (Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq) or there is a new strongman running parts or all of those countries。 In a strange way Vietnam is our only success, in that once we got our and minded our own business, the Regime (a hard corp Communist Cadre) has been replaced by technocrats and economists。Our lack of success in the Regime Incidents, seem to mirror the lack of success that we have had over the last fifty years in eliminating Poverty and Drugs。 Anyone who looks at the two public plans will see that not only are the poor poorer but the amount of drugs on the street and the violence it causes have only gotten worse。Considering the amount of money we have thrown at these problems, maybe we would have been better off giving all the people in these countries $50,ooo each and leaving with a way to upgrade their lives and not lose any of our military。 。。。more

Joseph Spuckler

Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East by Philip H。 Gordon is a St。 Martin Press publication。 Gordon is an American diplomat and foreign policy expert。 From 2013 to 2015, Gordon served in the White House as Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region。 From 2009 to 2013, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs。In August 2007, a section of I-35 Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East by Philip H。 Gordon is a St。 Martin Press publication。 Gordon is an American diplomat and foreign policy expert。 From 2013 to 2015, Gordon served in the White House as Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region。 From 2009 to 2013, he served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs。In August 2007, a section of I-35 in Minneapolis collapsed into the Mississippi River, killing 13 people and injuring 145。 A commentator on the disaster said that part of the problem was that America was a great builder。 It took pride in building great works, but maintenance is rarely an afterthought。 This seems like an adept analogy for American regime change in other countries。 We will remove the regime but do little to establish a new system。 There are exceptions。 Installing the Shah as leader of Iran in 1953 and the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973 created decades of stable governments but under less than democratic rule。 Panama and Grenada proved to be mostly successful。Gordon borrows from Tolstoy to make another analogy — every unsuccessful regime change is unsuccessful in its own way。 There is not a formula that fits regime change, and rarely one that provides positive results。 The First Gulf War stopped short of removing Hussein because it would have left a power vacuum。 There was no replacement government。 There was no one or group to assume power, and the country would soon fall under Iranian influence。 In the second war, we expected that the people would rise and greet us as liberators。 In fact, the vice president was quoted: “Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators。” This was not to be the case。Losing the Long Game studies regime change in Iran (1953), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Egypt (2011), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011)。 The US involvement in the first Afghanistan conflict was by proxy to oust the Soviet government and support the resistance。 Here we helped create and empower our own enemies。 That was by no means the plan。 America likes the easy part of overthrowing regimes。 We have the military power to do so with minimum loss of life on our part。 When it comes to peacekeeping and nation-building, we shy away。 Although the loss of life in war is a terrible cost, there is a tolerance for it in public opinion as long as it is seen as a good fight or a battle against evil。 Death in peacekeeping or nation-building has little patience in public opinion。 Elected leaders feel the need to bring the troops back home as quickly and safely as possible。After World War II, America stayed in Germany and Japan and kept the peace and allowed for nation-building。 Germany did have a background in elected governments, and the Soviet threat also created motivation for a stable government。 In Japan, we let the emperor live and allowed him to remain a ceremonial leader keeping the people united。 Douglas MacArthur drafted the new constitution, and its promise seemed to make us less of a hostile occupying force。 In both cases, we remained and, to some extent, still remain safeguarding their sovereignty。 We do not have that in the Middle East。 We are not liked and really never have been。The US use of force in the Middle East is seen as interference and not as assistance。 These are lands that, in many places, are made up of competing tribes and factions held together by strong leadership。 In the absence of leadership, they do not just fold, they fight among themselves for power and create further instability。 No two regimes are alike, and so far, we only recognize this in hindsight。 America’s policies in the Middle East and Near Asia remain a difficult situation。 Interference digs us a deeper hole。 Non-intervention creates moral dilemmas and security issues。 We have the will to fight but not the will to rebuild。 We attack symptoms but ignore the cause。 An excellent book examining historical and current failures in diplomatic and military interventions。 。。。more